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Abstract: 
Dual Process Theory has recently been applied to Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) to suggest that 
reasoning by people with ASD and typically developing (TD) people with higher levels of ASD-like 
traits can be characterised by reduced intuitive and greater reflective processing. 26 adolescents and 
adults with ASD and 22 TD adolescents and adults completed the AQ, the cognitive reflections test 
(CRT) to measure intuitive and reflective reasoning and 12 items from Raven’s Advanced Progressive 
Matrices. The ASD group produced less intuitive responses, and the degree of ASD-like traits showed 
a negative correlation with intuitive responses and positive correlation with reflective responses on 
the CRT. These results are consistent with ASD being associated with reduced intuitive reasoning and 
greater reflective reasoning.   
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Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a neurodevelopmental disorder characterised by persistent 
deficits in social communication and interaction combined with restricted, repetitive patterns of 
behaviour, interests, or activities (APA, 2013). Studies of prevalence rates of ASD report estimates of 
up to one in 68 children (CDC, 2015). Whilst ASD is defined in DSM-5 as a behavioural disorder, much 
research over the past 25 years has focused upon cognitive differences in ASD, including difficulties 
in mindreading or empathizing and enhanced processing of local details (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 2009; 
Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985; Frith & Happé, 1994; Mottron, Dawson, Soulières, Hubert, & 
Burack, 2006), which address social and non-social aspects behaviours characteristic of ASD, 
respectively.   One promising area of recent research into the cognitive differences in ASD has 
involved reasoning. Reasoning and decision making are core human capabilities that enable effective 
participation within society (e.g. Irvin & Stansbury, 2004), yet to date these have received relatively 
little attention within the ASD field. Recently, however, Brosnan, Lewton and Ashwin (2016) have 
proposed a Dual Process Theory account of ASD. Dual Process Theory has been a major theory of 
reasoning within psychology for over 50 years (Frankish & Evans, 2009). It proposes that there are 
two distinct types of reasoning process: Type 1 which is autonomous and typically rapid and 
nonconscious (‘intuition’), and Type 2 which is typically slower and conscious (‘reflective’) and 
dependent upon cognitive ability (see Evans 2011; Evans & Stanovich 2013; Kahneman 2011; 
Stanovich & West 2000, 2008; for reviews; see Keren & Schul 2009 for critique; see Kruglanski & 
Gigerenzer 2011 for an alternative view). As an example, Type 1 processing may result in getting a 
‘bad feeling’ about someone when meeting them, despite not consciously knowing what led to that 
conclusion. Whereas Type 2 processing may result in someone not jumping to a conclusion about 
someone else until explicitly finding out more information about that person. Incongruent syllogisms 
provide a measureable example in which real-world context influences Type 1 processing 
(erroneously) whereas Type 2 processing results in a correct response (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 
1983). In the example “All flowers need water. Roses need water. Therefore, roses are flowers”, 
despite the believability of the two premises, the conclusion does not follow logically. 
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Brosnan et al. (2016) applied this dominant model of reasoning to ASD, to suggest that reasoning in 
ASD can be characterised as more reflective (Type 2) than intuitive (Type 1) processing. This is 
consistent with other research that has identified more logically consistent, circumspect reasoning 
within ASD as well as deficient intuition and difficulty making rapid decisions (Brosnan, Chapman & 
Ashwin, 2014; De Martino, Harrison, Knafo, Bird & Dolan, 2008; Klin & Volkmar, 1997; Luke, Clare, 
Ring, Redley, & Watson, 2012; Shah, Catmur & Bird, 2016). For example, De Martino et al. and Shah 
et al. have identified that autistic participants are less susceptible to biases such as the classic 
framing effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) associated with Type 1 processing. This lack of bias 
resulted in ‘enhanced logical consistency’ reflecting Type 2 processing in the autistic group. Within 
the general population, higher levels of ASD-like traits (measured via the AQ; Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin & Clubley, 2001) were also associated with reduced intuitive and 
greater reflective processing (Brosnan et al., 2016). 
One of the most widely used behavioural assessments of intuition and reflection is the Cognitive 
Reflections Test (CRT: Frederick 2005). The CRT comprises of three reasoning questions that have 
both an intuitive (incorrect) and reflective (correct) response (see Method section). Within Dual 
Process Theory, an initial intuitive response is theorised to reflect the output from Type 1 processing 
which has not been over-ridden by reflective (Type 2) processing. The over-riding of initial intuitive 
reasoning by subsequent reflective reasoning is demonstrated by achieving the correct answer. The 
typical dominance of the intuitive response in this task is reflected in over 80% of more than three 
thousand American college students exhibiting reasoning biased away from Type 2 processing 
(Frederick, 2005). Despite the relatively simple mathematics involved, most students do not get any 
questions correct, and less than 10% get all three questions correct (Toplak, West & Stanovich, 
2011). Brosnan, Hollinworth, Antoniadou and Lewton (2014) also report a sex difference with 
females more likely than males to provide an intuitive response, and vice versa (see also Campitelli & 
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Gerrans, 2014). Whilst intuitive and reflective responses are yoked such that if one is provided the 
other cannot provided, it is also possible to make random errors.  
Within Dual Process Theory, reflective, but not intuitive, reasoning is dependent upon general 
cognitive ability. Brosnan et al., however, did not take an index of general cognitive ability in 
addition to the CRT. Therefore, it could be that general cognitive ability may have played a role in 
the findings of differences in reasoning in ASD compared to typically developing participants (TDs). 
Within a TD university student-based population, higher AQ scores have been found to positively 
correlate with Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (Fugard, Stewart & Stenning, 2011). The 
present study therefore sought to replicate the CRT reasoning task on an ASD sample while including 
an index of general cognitive ability, 12 Ravens Advanced Progressive Matrices, in order to identify if 
more intuitive responding is related to generally lower levels of general cognitive ability in ASD (and 
reflective responding by higher levels of general cognitive ability). This is important as using the CRT 
assessment as an index of intuitive processing relies on incorrect responses. It was expected that the 
ASD group would show reduced intuitive reasoning and greater reflective reasoning compared to 
TDs. When looking at ASD-like traits in the combined samples, it was expected that higher ASD-like 
traits would be related to fewer intuitive and greater reflective responses on the CRT.  
Method 
Participants 
The participants comprised 26 individuals with ASD (17 male, 11 female) and 22 typically developing 
participants without ASD (11 male, 11 female) who served as the TD group. The ASD group had a 
mean age of 18.3 years (range 16-21; s.d. = 2.22) and the TD group had a mean age of 17.9 years 
(range 17-18; s.d. = 2.90). The proportion of males and females did not significantly differ between 
the two groups (X2(1) = .33, ns).  
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The ASD Group comprised of participants attending a University Summer School for students on the 
autism spectrum focused on providing an insight into university life (N = 18). On application to the 
summer school, students provided evidence of clinical diagnosis of ASD using international criteria 
(DSM-IV, APA, 1994; ICD-10, WHO, 1992) by a qualified professional to establish diagnosis. Further 
measures were employed to index the degree of ASD-like traits. The Social Communication 
Questionnaire (SCQ-Lifetime; Rutter, Bailey, & Lord, 2003), a 40-item parent report measure and the 
Autism Spectrum Quotient, a 50-item self-report measure (AQ: Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). The mean 
scores on the SCQ measures for the group were significantly above the clinical cut-offs (Mean SCQ 
score = 16.35, s.d. = 3.02, range = 13-27; t (17) = 3.79, p = .002). The mean score on the AQ for the 
ASD group was 29.42, which is considered reflective of clinical levels of ASD (Woodbury-Smith, 
Robinson, Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen, 2005; see Ruzich et al., 2015).  
 
The remaining eight participants were recruited from the Student Disability Service at the University 
of XXXX. An email advertising the study was sent to the service actively recruiting people with a 
formal diagnosis of ASD for a study on reasoning. Although the diagnostic reports had been 
confirmed by the Student Disability Service, they were not available to the researchers. Scores on 
the SCQ were not available for this subset of participants. All participants from this group attained a 
score on the AQ of at least 26 (Woodbury-Smith et al., 2005). The typically developing (TD) group (N 
= 22) was an opportunity sample of male and female students commencing their first year at the 
same University. Inclusion in the TD group was by confirming that they had never received a clinical 
diagnosis of an Autism Spectrum Disorder or any psychiatric conditions and their scores on the AQ. 
The research was approved by the Psychology Departmental Research Ethics Committee at the 
University of XXXX, which implements the ethical guidelines of the British Psychological Society. 
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Measures 
The Cognitive Reflection Task (CRT: Frederick, 2005) is a widely used 3-item performance measure of 
intuition and reflection. Each question has a potentially intuitive and reflective answer, as well as the 
potential for wrong answers. Scores can therefore range from 0 to 3 for each subscale. (Note: the 
intuitive response is a wrong answer). The questions were (as Frederick, 2005, except ‘pence’ 
adjusted from ‘cents’, and £/pound for $/dollar): (1) A bat and a ball cost £1.10 in total. The bat 
costs a pound more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? ____ pence [Correct answer 5 
pence; intuitive answer 10 pence]; (2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long 
would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets? ____ minutes [Correct answer 5 minutes; intuitive 
answer 100 minutes]; (3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If 
it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover 
half of the lake? ____ days [Correct answer 47 days; intuitive answer 24 days]. The CRT a reported 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.66 (Campitelli & Gerrans, 2014). 
 
The Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (SET I) was included as an index of general cognitive 
ability (see Chiesi, Primi, & Morsanyi, 2011; Chiesi, Ciancaleoni, Galli, & Primi, 2012; Ciancaleoni, 
Primi, & Chiesi, 2010; Donati et al., 2014; Morsanyi et al., 2012; Primi et al., 2015; see also Waschl et 
al., 2015). Set I of the Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM; Raven, 1962) was administered as a 
short form of the Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices. Set I consists of 12 matrices, and 
participants select the correct response out of eight possible responses. Set I is usually used as a 
practice and screening set for the full test, and it draws on all the intellectual processes sampled on 
the full test (although does not extend to the highest levels of complexity). This measure has 
adequate validity and reliability and a reported Cronbach’s alpha of .78 (see Chiesi et al., 2011; 
2012). 
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Results 
Table 1 about here 
 
The means (standard deviations) for both groups are reported in Table 1. A MANOVA was conducted 
with CRT-Intuitive and CRT-Reflective responses as the dependent variables and Group (ASD/TD) as 
the independent variable with sex (Male/Female) and general cognitive ability as covariates. The 
ASD group made significantly less intuitive responses than the TD group (F(1,44)=4.43, p<.05), with 
no significant difference in reflective responses (F(1,44)=2.38, p>.05). The covariates were not 
significant (P>.05). Finally partial correlations were run pooling all the participants together for 
greater power and controlling for group (ASD/TD) and sex (Male/female), and this revealed a 
significant negative correlation between ASD-like traits and CRT-Intuitive (r(44)= -0.29, p<.05), and a 
significant positive correlation between ASD-like traits and CRT-Reflective (r(44)= 0.25, p<.05). 
Repeating these partial correlations, CRT-Intuitive and CRT-Reflective did not significantly correlate 
with the index of general cognitive ability (both p>.05) 
Discussion 
Consistent with the Dual Process Theory of ASD (Brosnan et al., 2016), the ASD group had fewer 
intuitive responses on the CRT, though no group differences were found for reflective reasoning. The 
samples were then pooled to increase the power in looking at the relationship of ASD-like traits with 
reasoning, and results with the pooled sample showed that higher ASD-like traits related to fewer 
intuitive reasoning responses and more reflective responses on the CRT. The results were not 
related to general cognitive ability as the groups were comparable in their level of general cognitive 
ability and this was controlled for in the analysis of the group differences. Furthermore, no 
relationship was found between general cognitive ability and intuitive or deliberative reasoning. This 
Brief report: Intuitive and reflective reasoning in Autism Spectrum Disorder 
8 
 
is pertinent as intuitive responses on the CRT are incorrect responses, and the inclusion of the 
general cognitive ability measure is consistent with the ASD sample not simply making more errors 
per se, but being less susceptible to biases in reasoning specifically (Brosnan et al., 2016; De Martino 
et al., 2008; Shah et al., 2016). Inconsistent with previous research, the ASD sample did not obtain 
more correct answers than the TD group. Together, however, the results generally support the Dual 
Process Theory of ASD (Brosnan et al., 2016) in ASD and TD samples containing comparable numbers 
of males and females.  
There are few behavioural measures available to test intuition, and the CRT-intuitive index is heavily 
dependent upon the CRT-Reflective index, which is based upon getting answers incorrect (albeit in a 
pre-specified way, as opposed to random errors). Pennycook et al. (2015) argue that the CRT-
Intuitive index is best viewed as a propensity towards intuition, rather than intuitive ability. 
Consistent with this, the present study suggests that those with ASD do not have such a propensity 
towards intuitive (Type 1) processing as is typically seen in the general population, rather they have 
a propensity towards reflective (Type 2) processing. Partial correlations (controlling for group and 
sex) indicated that higher levels of ASD-like traits significantly influence this propensity towards 
reflective processing and away from intuitive processing. The ASD group, however, did not obtain 
more correct responses, and it is conceivable that ASD is associated with a reflective propensity 
rather than a reflective ability. That is to say, those with ASD may be characterised as more likely to 
engage in reflective processing, but not necessarily that the reflective processing will result in the 
correct response (correct responses may be more to related general cognitive ability – this 
relationship was not found in the present study but has been reported by Toplak et al., 2011). Toplak 
et al. (2011) suggest that whilst reflective processing on the CRT and general cognitive ability are 
correlated with each other and performance on other reasoning tasks, the CRT additionally and 
uniquely assesses the tendency towards over-riding intuitive processing with reflective processing. 
Morsanyi, Handley and Evans (2010) also found that those with ASD were less biased in their 
reasoning (less susceptible to the conjunction fallacy) consistent with reduced Type 1 processing, but 
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they were not more logical than the TD group in a normative sense. The current results are 
consistent with those findings, as we also found that the ASD group had reduced intuitive reasoning 
compared to the TD group, but that group differences were not evident for reflective reasoning. 
Whether intuitive processing is impaired in ASD or intact but dominated by reflective processing is 
still unknown (Brosnan et al., 2016). 
Intuitive processing is associated with using heuristics and biases which prove useful in some 
instances, but can also result in errors of judgement in other situations. This indicates that the 
reasoning of people with ASD will be less susceptible to potentially erroneous biases (Brosnan et al., 
2016; De Martino et al., 2008; Shah et al., 2016). Since many social and emotional processes are 
typically associated with intuitive processing because they involve rapidly-changing situations 
requiring fast judgements and responses (see Rand, 2016; Rand et al., 2012; 2014), a bias away from 
intuitive processing would be expected to result in social difficulties consistent with those seen in 
ASD. For example, when recounting a story someone might perceive quick and subtle cues of 
boredom in others, and so intuitively alter the story to suit the audience’s mood, either by making it 
more interesting or ending it quickly. If someone with ASD noticed the same cues while recounting a 
story they might not intuitively make such a fast and automatic alteration the story, and instead try 
and use reflective mechanisms which would prove difficult and effortful given that cognitive 
resources were being used to tell the story (which might even lead to an even longer and more 
laborious story). In this example, social communication and interaction difficulties in ASD are related 
to difficulties processing social heuristics typical of intuitive (Type 1) processing.  Returning to the 
example in the Introduction, Type 1 processing quickly resulting in a ‘bad feeling’ about someone 
else, may lead to consequent behaviours that minimise the risk of being bullied, exploited or 
harmed. In this situation, Type 2 processing might be less likely to quickly detect this ‘bad feeling’, 
resulting in greater vulnerability to being bullied, exploited or harmed. 
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In addition to a relative weakness in mindreading and empathizing, Baron-Cohen (2006; 2009; 
Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; 2009) characterises ASD as a relative strength in systemizing, which is 
defined as a drive to analyse or construct systems.  What defines a system is that it follows rules, 
systemizing is the identification of the rules that govern the system, in order to predict how that 
system will behave. Both self-report and behavioural assessments of systemizing have been found to 
correlate with self-report and behavioural assessments of Type 2 processing (Brosnan et al., 2014b). 
An overreliance of systemising (or hyper-systemising) may therefore be related to a relative 
dominance of Type 2 processing in ASD. Brosnan et al. (2014b) also found that self-report and 
behavioural assessments of empathizing correlated with self-report and behavioural assessments of 
Type 1 processing. Thus reduced empathizing and preserved or enhanced systemising would be seen 
as correlates of relatively reduced Type 1 processing relative to Type 2 processing within a Dual 
Process Theory of ASD. For example, the Dual Process Theory of ASD would propose that ASD is 
characterised by difficulties processing rapid social heuristics, such as low intensity facial emotion 
expressions (e.g. Wingenbach, Ashwin & Brosnan, 2017), rather than a deficit in empathy (although 
there may be downstream consequences for empathy of impaired facial emotion recognition 
capabilities; e.g. Clark, Winkielman, & McIntosh, 2008). The extent to which Type 2 processing is 
employed by autistic people in tasks that typically employ Type 1 processing is also an avenue for 
future research, for example, explicit strategies for facial emotion recognition (‘corners of mouth 
turned down, lowered eyebrows = sad’: Rutherford & MacIntosh, 2007; Walsh, Vida, & Rutherford 
2014; see also Ashwin et al., 2007; Brosnan et al., 2015; Golan and Baron-Cohen, 2006; Golan et al., 
2010). 
Future research can also establish whether a bias away from Type 1, intuitive processing is related to 
a bias away from utilising context in perceptual and cognitive tasks.  Evans and Stanovich (2013) 
identify contextualised processing as a typical correlate of Type 1 processing. Decontextualised 
abstract reasoning is typical of Type 2 processing, although this is not a defining feature as not all 
Type 2 processing is context-free. Within the Reverse Hierarchy Theory of visual perception, an 
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initial rapid processing of low spatial frequency information for gist (vision at a glance) is proposed 
to precede a slower detailed processing of high spatial frequency (vision with scrutiny; see 
Vanmarcke & Wagemans, 2016). Vanmarcke and Wagemans found that higher autistic traits (within 
a general population) were associated with more effective processing of high spatial frequency (fine, 
detailed analysis) in conditions with more time. ASD was found to be associated with deficits in the 
rapid processing of social relations specifically from visual scenes (Vanmarcke et al., 2016a;b). Future 
research can establish whether Type 1 and 2 processing within the context of reasoning relate to 
these differences in rapid visual perception and categorisation of real-life scenes as well as 
established differences in perceptual and cognitive assessments of global, gist, or gestalt processing 
(e.g. Bowler, Gaigg & Gardiner, 2008; Farran & Brosnan, 2011; Shah & Frith, 1983; 1993; Parra et al., 
2016), which inform Weak Central Coherence Theory, Enhanced Perceptual Theory and the Task 
Support Hypothesis (Frith & Happé, 1994; Mottron, et al., 2006; Bowler, Matthews, & Gardiner, 
1997; respectively). Whilst Brosnan et al. (2016) showed the same pattern of Type1/ Type 2 
processing in an ASD sample and a TD sample with high autistic traits, this does not necessarily imply 
that ASD is an extreme variant of autistic traits and that research based upon high autistic traits 
groups will necessarily extend to autistic groups.  
There are some limitations to the study to be noted. One limitation is the nature of the sample, as 
the participants all had higher levels of general cognitive ability as they were either going to 
university or intending to go to university, and therefore are not reflective of the ASD population as 
a whole. Further research of this type needs to be undertaken with people with ASD of varying levels 
of general cognitive ability. There was a significant age difference between the groups, although the 
means were just above and just below 18 years of age (adding in age to the MANOVA, makes no 
discernible difference to the result). Although no participants self-reported a comorbid disorder, this 
was not formally screened for through questionnaire assessments in the present study. Whilst there 
was a relatively large proportion of females within the ASD sample, numbers were not sufficient to 
allow for a detailed analysis of sex differences. In addition, the CRT and Set I of the Advanced 
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Progressive Matrices assessments have limited numbers of questions, so the results need to be 
replicated with further measures. We also did not include a measure of verbal ability. Despite these 
limitations, the findings are largely consistent with the Dual Process Theory account of ASD. In 
summary, the present study replicates previous results consistent with the Dual Process Theory of 
ASD, showing that greater ASD-like traits are associated with reduced intuitive reasoning and greater 
reflective reasoning and ASD is associated with diminished intuition. Furthermore, this is the first 
study to identify that more intuitive responding is not solely due to lower levels of general cognitive 
ability in ASD. This is important as using the CRT assessment as an index of intuitive processing relies 
on incorrect responses.  
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Table 1. Means (standard deviations) for the ASD and TD groups 
 
Demographics 
And measures 
ASD 
N= 26 
TD 
N=22 
Cohen’s d  
Age 
AQ (max 50) 
APM  (max 12) 
CRT-Intuitive (max 3) 
CRT-Reflective (max 3) 
18.65 (1.85) 
29.42 (5.48) 
9.58 (1.72) 
0.54 (0.71) 
1.38 (0.85) 
17.91 (0.29) 
14.73 (4.91) 
9.91 (1.44) 
1.14 (1.04) 
1.82 (1.10) 
0.55 
2.82 
0.21 
0.67 
0.45 
t(46)=2.01, p<.05 
t(46)=9.71, p<.001 
ns 
t(46)=2.36, p<.05 
ns 
Note: AQ – Autism Quotient; APM – Advanced, Progressive Matrices (Set I); CRT – Cognitive 
Reflections Test. 
